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This paper investigates the impact of Texas's Top Ten Percent Rule|which
grants automatic to any public college in Texas for Texas high school graduates
who graduate in the top decile|and subsequent targeted recruitment programs
initiated by Texas's °agship universities. Using data on SAT test takers in
Texas from 1996{2004, we ¯nd that the Top Ten Percent rule a®ects the set
of colleges that students consider, and the targeted recruitment programs are
able to attract the attention of students from poor high schools that were not
traditional sources of students for the °agships in Texas.
JEL Codes: I20, I23, I28
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The end of a±rmative action in Texas|following Hopwood v. Texas decision|
led to precipitous drops in minority enrollment at the University of Texas at
Austin and Texas A&M University-College Station. Kain et al. (2005) report
that in the two years following the Hopwood v. Texas decision the mean number
of black and Hispanic high school graduates from Texas enrolling as freshmen at
the University of Texas at Austin1 and Texas A&M-College Station2 declined by
twenty-eight percent and fourteen percent, respectively. To reverse the decline in
minority enrollment at Texas's °agship public institutions, the Texas legislature
passed House Bill 588 or the Top Ten Percent Rule (TTPR) which was signed
into law on May 20, 1997 by then governor George W. Bush. The Top Ten
Percent Rule grants automatic admission to any public college or university
in Texas for Texas high school graduates who both ¯nish in the top decile of
their graduating cohort and submit a completed application for admission to a
qualifying postsecondary institution within two years of graduating.3
The Top Ten Percent Rule alone was not su±cient to restore minority enroll-
ment at Texas's °agship institutions to the levels obtained prior to the Hopwood
v. Texas decision. The enrollment of blacks and Hispanics as ¯rst-time freshman
at selective public institutions in Texas as a percentage of black and Hispanic
enrollment in all Texas public colleges and universities for the years 1998{2000
remained below the level obtained in 1996, the year prior to the Hopwood v.
Texas decision (see Table 3 of Kain et al., 2005). Long (2007) presents evidence
that the TTPR did little to undo the e®ects of Hopwood v Texas on the under-
representation of blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans at the University of
Texas at Austin and Texas A&M-College Station.
In an attempt to attract a diverse body of students to the college without
individually identifying the students by race or ethnicity, the University of Texas
at Austin identi¯ed 70 Texas high schools that were both poor and, historically,
had not had many students matriculate at the University of Texas at Austin.
These schools, on average, consisted of student bodies that were more than
ninety percent minority (Tienda and Niu, 2006) and only ten percent of students
had college educated parents (Niu et al., 2006). The most deserving graduates
at these high schools|which includes students who were not in the top decile|
were o®ered scholarships, smaller classes, and tutoring if they were admitted
to the University of Texas at Austin. This program, which was introduced to
selected Texas high schools in 1999, 2000, and 2001, is known as the Longhorn
Opportunity Scholarship (LOS) Program.4
1We use the University of Texas at Austin and UT Austin interchangeably.
2We use Texas A&M-College Station and Texas A&M interchangeably.
3House Bill 588 also allows each public college or university in Texas to annually determine
if it will o®er automatic admission to graduates in the top quartile and provides each institution
with a list of eighteen factors that can be used in making admissions decisions if a student
does not qualify for automatic admissions
4The Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship information was obtained from Dr. Lawrence W.
Burt, former associate vice president and director of student ¯nancial services at the University
of Texas at Austin.
1Texas A&M-College Station followed suit in 2000 with its Century Schol-
ars (CS) program which o®ers scholarships to the graduates of 40 high schools
located in Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio. The high schools were selected
based on the high poverty rates of their students and the low number of applica-
tions that the students from these schools sent to Texas A&M University-College
Station.5
In addition to the bene¯ts discussed above, the universities also send stu-
dents back to their respective high schools to share information about their
college experiences. This is true outreach; the °agship institutions in Texas
are attempting to make students from disadvantaged high schools feel welcome
and, in the process, change the very perceptions that deterred disadvantaged
students from considering these schools a viable postsecondary option.
The Top Ten Percent rule and the implementation of targeted recruitment
and ¯nancial aid programs by two of Texas's selective universities o®er the
opportunity to examine two questions:
1. What is the impact of both the increased emphasis and transparent use
of class rank on the score-report sending behavior of Texas's high School
Graduates?
2. How does targeted ¯nancial aid and recruitment a®ect the application
behavior of potential recipients?
Previous research by Card and Krueger (2005) ¯nds that getting rid of Af-
¯rmative Action in California and Texas had no e®ect on the set of schools
that highly quali¯ed minorities designated to receive score reports, which we
also use as our proxy for applications. Long (2004), using a random sample
of ten percent of all SAT I takers from 1996{2000, ¯nds that the gap between
minorities and non-minorities in the number of score reports sent to in-state
public institutions widened. Dickson (2006) ¯nds a signi¯cant decrease in the
percentage of graduates taking admissions examinations after the implementa-
tion of the Top Ten Percent Rule. She also ¯nds that high schools that were
selected as Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship schools experienced an increase
in the percentage of graduates who attempted admissions examinations.
Our paper builds on the existing literature in several ways. First, we are
interested in evaluating the e®ects of the transition from an admissions regime
where class rank is merely one factor in the admissions to a regime where class
rank is the primary factor in admissions for a subset of Texas high school gradu-
ates, regardless of high school quality and standardized test scores. In contrast
to Card and Krueger (2005), we do not limit our sample to highly quali¯ed
test-takers as measured by SAT performance or grade point average. We also
consider students who previously might not have been admitted to the top
5The Century Scholar program information was obtained from correspondence with Myra
Gonzalez, Associate Director of the O±ce of Honors Programs and Academic Scholarships at
Texas A&M - College Station.
2schools in Texas under a±rmative action but who would likely be admitted un-
der the Top Ten Percent Rule|for example, students who graduate in the top
decile but have low standardized test scores.6
Second, our data allows us to investigate in detail the set of colleges students
selected to receive score reports. Thus, whereas Long (2004) is able to only
observe classi¯cations of the colleges that are designated to receive score reports,
we observe the student's full choice set.
Third, only limited evidence has been gathered in the evaluation of targeted
recruitment programs. The analysis in Dickson (2006) is conducted at the high-
school level and focuses on the extensive margin of test taking, the percent of
graduates that attempt an admissions examination. In addition, Dickson (2006)
focuses only on the LOS program; our data allow us to examine the impact of
both the LOS program and the CS program on the actual score report sending
behavior of individual students, conditioned on a student having attempted the
SAT I examination. This provides a more direct measure of the e®ectiveness of
such programs. If the programs work, then the probability that students from
either an LOS school or a CS school sent score reports to the University of Texas
at Austin and Texas A&M-College Station, respectively, will increase relative
to the probabilities for similar students from non-Longhorn high schools and
non-Century Scholar schools.
Since the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship schools are so di®erent from
other high schools in Texas, naively using the other high schools in Texas as a
comparison group could lead to biased estimates of the impact of the Longhorn
Opportunity Scholarship and Century Scholar programs. We take a number
of steps to reduce the bias caused by the non-random selection of treated high
schools in estimating the impact of the targeted recruitment and ¯nancial aid
programs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section Two discusses
the data. Section Three describes the empirical methodology. Section Four
discusses the results. Section Five concludes.
2 Data
The data we use for this paper was obtained from two sources. First, we down-
loaded Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS) data from the Texas Ed-
ucational Agency (TEA). This is high school level data, available publicly on
the internet, which provides a wide range of information on the performance of
students in each public school and public school district in Texas for each aca-
demic year. These data include Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS)
performance, attendance rates, dropout rates, completion rates, the ethnic com-
position of the student body, the mean SAT and ACT scores of the high school,
6For example, Card and Krueger (2005) classify students who have a SAT score greater
than 1150 as being highly quali¯ed. In our data set, we identify 74;472 students who both
self-identify as being in the top ten percent of their class and have SAT scores less than 1150.
3and the percentage of students who attempt either the SAT or ACT examina-
tions.7
Second, we obtained detailed student level data from the College Board. This
data set contains the SAT verbal and math scores of every high school senior
in the state of Texas who took the SAT exam, from the cohorts graduating in
1996 until 2004. The data set also includes demographic information on the
test takers, such as age, race, gender, the number of score reports sent, and the
identity of the colleges designated to receive the score report.8
The data set includes a unique high school identi¯er which we used to merge
the two data sets. In addition, we have any information available via the SAT
Student Descriptive Questionnaire (SDQ). The SDQ is a section of the SAT
which contains information on family background, high school courses and per-
formance, college aspirations, and, most importantly for this study, a student's
class rank. It should be stressed that the entire SDQ, as well as any particular
question, is voluntary. Moreover, the responses are all self-reported.
We use the information on the score report sending behavior of students
in Texas to examine the e®ects of the Top Ten Percent Rule and the targeted
recruitment programs on college choice. Using the SAT as the source of infor-
mation raises two questions. First, to what extent do colleges and universities
require standardized test scores? Second, how popular is the SAT relative to the
ACT, another standardized exam that is often used in the admissions decision?
In addressing the ¯rst question, we note that the use of standardized tests in
the admissions decision is quite popular, only slightly more than thirty-two per-
cent of bachelor degree granting institutions|779 out of 2425|in the United
states deemphasize or make no use of the SAT or ACT in making admissions
decisions.9
Thomas (2004), using data from the Texas Schools Microdata Panel, shows
that the SAT is the prevalent examination for students in Texas who decide to
take a college entrance exam. Thomas (2004) plots the percentages of Texas
students taking only the SAT, only the ACT, and both examinations for the
years 1991{1999.10 In the year 1999, for example, ¯fty percent of Texas students
took only the SAT, twenty percent of Texas students took only the ACT, and
thirty percent of Texas students took both the SAT and the ACT. During the
years 1991{1999 the percentage of students attempting only the ACT declined
by ¯ve percentage points while the percentage of students who chose to take
both examinations increased from twenty-six percent to thirty percent. Given
that the majority of four year institutions require standardized examinations
and the prevalence of the SAT in Texas, we are con¯dent that examining the
choice set of SAT test takers accurately represents the choice set of Texas stu-
dents.
7The URL is http://www.tea.state.tx.us/
8We only have racial information for students from the 1999 cohort onwards
9Authors' calculation using information from both the National Center for Fair and Open
Testing and the National Center for Education Statistics
10See Thomas (2004) Figure 1.
4[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics. We restrict our sample to include
students for whom we are able to match with their high school level data. This
primarily excludes students in private high schools. In total, we have 916,348
remaining unique student observations across all years combined, with a mean
number of test takers of about 102,000 per year.11 Of these, approximately 11
percent are Black, 17 percent are Hispanic and 46 percent are White, with a
sizable proportion for whom we do not have racial information. Roughly 54.5
percent of takers are female, and the average performance of these Texas grad-
uates is 458 points and 466 points on the verbal and mathematical component
of the SAT, respectively.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Score Report Sending
We use the temporal variation in the importance of rank with respect to the
probability of admissions to identify the impact of the change in the admis-
sions regime on the score report sending behavior of Texas's public high school














Yist, our outcome, is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one in the
event that student i in high school s in year t engages in a particular behav-
ior with respect to score report sending. Examples of the outcomes that Yist
represent are whether or not a student sent score reports to: UT Austin, Texas
A&M, a non-selective public college in Texas, an elite national university, both
UT Austin and Texas A&M, an out-of-state college, and whether the student
sends more than four score reports in total.13
We include both high-school ¯xed e®ects, ®s, a linear time trend, ®t and a
dummy variable, ®1996, that assumes a value of one for the academic year 1996.
We only have two years of data before the Top Ten Percent Rule goes into
e®ect. A±rmative Action policies are in e®ect for the academic year 1996.
This makes the comparison year 1997, when neither A±rmative Action nor the
TTPR was in e®ect. Including a dummy variable for the one year of A±rmative
Action is probably unable to fully account for the impact of an admissions regime
that allows the explicit use of race in the admissions process. The most direct
solution would be to include race in our models. However, we lack information
11The original sample size was 1,068,071 individuals.
12We use linear probability models for two reasons: 1) The reduced computational burden
of including ¯xed e®ects in a linear model. 2) The ease of interpreting the coe±cients.
13The ¯rst four score reports are free. A student must pay a fee for each additional score
report that he or she chooses to send.
5on the test-takers' racial/ethnic grouping for the years 1996{1998, so we cannot
directly address this issue. It is important to consider how omitting race a®ects
what we are able to estimate. We view the policy experiment as being a change
from a regime where class rank is one factor among many factors to a regime
where the use of class rank in the admissions process is clearly delineated and
understood by all interested parties. A more complete analysis would examine
the e®ects of the interaction of race, self-reported class rank, and the increased
emphasis on rank in the admissions process on choice; that is, we are unable to
estimate racial/ethnic speci¯c e®ects of the policy. We do, however, estimate
the impact of the change in the importance of rank in the admissions process, on
average, across all the race groups, an important and policy relevant quantity.
We include year speci¯c high school level variables, Xst which include, for
example, the student-to-teacher ratio, the percentage of the high school that is
black, and the percentage of the high school that is Hispanic. Xist are individual
level characteristics; we include the individual's verbal SAT score and math
SAT score. Tienda and Niu (2006) and Niu et al. (2006) show that high school
attributes a®ect college choice. Students who score well on the SAT are likely to
select a di®erent set of colleges relative to students who do not score well. We
include the variables in Xst and Xist to account for their in°uence on college
choice and to reduce the potential bias in estimating the e®ects of the increased
importance of class rank on college choice.
The R
j
ist are a series of rank dummies. The excluded category consists of
students who are in the third quintile. The rank dummies assume a value of
one if student i in school s in year t identi¯es as being in one of the following
categories: the ¯rst decile, the second decile, the second quintile, the third
quintile, the fourth quintile, the ¯fth quintile, and non-reported rank. We cluster
at the high school level both to produce standard errors that are robust to using
variables that are at a higher level of aggregation than the micro-units (Moulton,
1990), as well as to allow for arbitrary temporal correlation of the "ist's within
a cluster (Bertrand et al., 2004).
The coe±cients of interest are ±
j
P, the coe±cients associated with the inter-
action terms, R
j
ist£Post, where Post is a dummy variable that assumes a value
of one for the Top Ten Percent Rule Regime, the years 1998{2004. To °esh out
the interpretation of the ±
j
P consider the following example. Let Yist represent
the event that a student sends a score report to a non-selective public college
or university in Texas and consider the coe±cient associated with the interac-
tion term between the indicator for the top decile and the indicator dummy
for the Top Ten Percent Rule admissions regime. This coe±cient represents
the di®erence in the probability that a student in the top decile sends a score
report to a non-selective institution relative to the probability that she would
have sent a score report to a non-selective public university in Texas prior to the
advent of the Top Ten Percent Rule. Similar interpretations apply to the coe±-
cient estimates with respect to both di®erent rank categorizations and di®erent
outcomes.
We include a full set of rank and post interactions. This speci¯cation allows
6for us to examine the impact of the Top Ten Percent rule across the entire
distribution of rank. However, it precludes us from including a full set of year
dummies as this would induce perfect collinearity with the set of year dummies
from 1998 onwards This means that the estimates of the Top Ten Percent Rule's
e®ects on the rank classi¯cations are somewhat con°ated with the overall period
e®ects, but this is a reasonable tradeo® as we want to look at the changes over
the entire distribution of rank.
3.2 Targeted Recruitment and Financial Aid
3.2.1 Pre-Post Analysis
We use two methods to analyze the e®ects of the Longhorn Opportunity Schol-
arship and Century Scholars program. The ¯rst method is a simple pre-post
comparison where we limit the sample to Texas high schools that eventually
are targeted by either the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship or the Century
Scholars program. This method uses the behavior of test-takers in Texas high
schools that eventually receive the targeted recruitment programs in the years
before the high schools received the programs to provide the counterfactual.
We estimate models of the following form:



















ist) + "ist (2)
Equation (2) is the same speci¯cation as equation (1) with the addition of
the terms DT £ R
j
ist. We limit the outcomes, Yist, to the University of Texas
at Austin and Texas A&M as these are the universities that instituted targeted
recruitment programs. The targeted recruitment programs were instituted after
the Top Ten Percent Rule was passed; therefore, we include the interaction
terms, (R
j
ist £ Post) to control for the e®ects of the Top Ten Percent Rule.
DT is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one the year that a
public high school in Texas receives either the Longhorn Opportunity Scholar-
ship or the Century Scholars Program, respectively.14 R
j
ist are a series of rank
dummies. DT £R
j
ist are interaction terms. The coe±cients associated with the
interaction terms, ±
j
T, represent the e®ects of the targeted recruitment programs
on the likelihood of a student with self-reported class rank R
j
ist submitting to
the University of Texas at Austin when we analyze the Longhorn Opportunity
Scholarship or Texas A&M when we consider the Century Scholars Program.
The standard errors are clustered at the high school level.
14Some high schools that were originally designated to receive the Century Scholars Program
lost their status. We only include schools|and thus students in the schools|who upon being
designated for targeted recruitment maintained that status over the years spanned by our
data.
73.2.2 Matching and Regression Adjustment
A simple pre-post design can not account for contemporaneous factors that
a®ect the outcomes regardless of whether students in the high schools were
treated or untreated. The selection of an appropriate control group allows us to
di®erence out these factors. We use a combination of propensity score matching
and regression adjustment to deal with these issues.
We ¯rst estimate the conditional probabilities that public high schools in
Texas are selected to receive either the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship or
the Century Scholar Program, P(LonghornjX) or P(CenturyjX). That is, we
estimate the propensity score of treatment by either of the recruitment programs
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In estimating the propensity score, we use a
probit speci¯cation that includes as regressors high school level characteristics
from the year 1996. For example in estimating P(LonghornjX), we include the
percentage of the high school's students sending to the University of Texas at
Austin, the percentage of the high school's students on free or reduced price
meals, the percentage of the high school that is white, the percentage of the
high school that is black, the student-to-teacher ratio, and the number of twelfth
graders. All variables are entered linearly. The speci¯cation for the estimate of
P(CenturyjX) is the same as the speci¯cation for P(LonghornjX) except that
we include measures of the percentage of the high school's test takers that send
score reports to Texas A&M-College Station.
We make a conditional independence assumption; that is, we assume that
assignment to treatment is random after conditioning on the covariates. This
assumption is reasonable because in our propensity score speci¯cation we include
one of the measures used to determine assignment, the percentage of students
sending to the relevant recruiting university and proxy for the socioeconomic
status of the student body by using the percentage of a high school's students
that receive free or reduced price meals.
The estimated propensity score is employed in a kernel matching procedure
to determine an appropriate set of counterfactual high schools.15 We impose a
common support condition and estimate models of the same form as equation (2)
where students in the \treated" high schools are given a weight of one and
students in the \control" high schools are given the kernel weight assigned to
the high school by the matching procedure. We again cluster the standard
errors at the high school level. With a defensible set of counterfactuals, we
are able to reduce potential bias in estimating the impact of the Longhorn
Opportunity Scholarship program and the Century Scholar program on students
in the schools that received the programs.
In an appendix table, we include the results from estimating the propensity
scores. For the LOS program, the percentage of students sending score reports
to the University of Texas at Austin has a negative and signi¯cant e®ect on the
likelihood of a high school receiving the program. This is to be expected, as
15We use an epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of .06. In results not shown, a number of
alternative bandwidths were used. The results obtained from using the alternative bandwidths
are qualitatively similar to the results presented in this manuscript.
8schools were selected that had not sent many students to the University of Texas
at Austin. The percentage of the high school that is black has a positive and
signi¯cant e®ect on the probability of a school being selected. The percentage
of the high school that is white enters the regression with a negative sign and is
statistically signi¯cant. The student to teacher ratio also enters the regression
positively and is signi¯cant. The signs of these coe±cients are reasonable as the
majority of schools selected for the program are urban schools with student bod-
ies that are minority laden and have classes with high student to teacher ratios.
The same pattern emerges for the estimated probability of treatment for the CS
program. The percentage of a high school's students that send score reports to
Texas A&M enters the regression with the expected sign but is not statistically
signi¯cant. The high school demographics and the student to teacher ratio have
the same sign as the analogous coe±cients in the estimated propensity score
for the LOS program. The pseudo-R2 for the LOS and CS models are 0.595
and 0.537, respectively. Corresponding Â2 statistics strongly indicate that the
estimated propensity score models have predictive power.
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
[Figures 3 and 4 about here]
Figures 1 and 3 shows the entire distribution of estimated propensity scores
among the treated and untreated schools for the LOS and CS programs that
are on the common support.16 The striking feature of the graphs is the large
mass of untreated schools with propensity scores that are less than .05. However,
given that the majority of high schools had very low probabilities of receiving
the targeted recruitment programs, it is reassuring to see this re°ected in the
distribution of propensity scores.
Figures 2 and 4 show the distribution of estimated propensity scores for the
LOS and CS programs with the set of schools on the common support with
propensity scores that are greater than .05. With these graphs, it is easier
to see that there are high schools that didn't receive the treatment that are
comparable to the schools that did receive the targeted recruitment programs
with respect to the value of the propensity score.
For the LOS program, 55 of 65 treated schools are not excluded by the
common support condition. For the CS program, 23 of 38 treated schools are
not excluded by the common support condition. The range of propensity scores
that de¯ne the common support are from `almost zero'17 to 0.920 for the LOS
program and 0.784 for the CS program.
[Tables 2a and 2b about here]
16The common support condition is operationalized by excluding treated high schools|and
thus students in those high schools|with propensity scores that exceed the maximum score
obtained by the set of untreated high schools or are less than the minimum score obtained by
the set of untreated high schools.
17i.e. 6:59 £ 10¡13 for LOS and 1:46 £ 10¡7 for CS.
9In Tables 2a and 2b, we present the e®ect that the common support condition
and kernel weighting has on the mean value of various covariates measured in
1996, prior to the introduction of LOS and CS. The full sample consists of
the high schools with the necessary covariates to estimate the propensity score.
For most covariates the imposition of the common support and weighting is to
decrease the absolute value of the di®erence between the treated and untreated
schools, especially for the variables that correspond to the demographics of the
high schools. For LOS, the di®erence in the percent of test-takers who send a
score report to UT Austin decreases from a signi¯cant 7 percentage points to
a statistically insigni¯cant -1 percentage points . For CS, the di®erence in the
percent of test-takers who send a score report to Texas A&M decreases from a
signi¯cant 7 percentage points to a statistically insigni¯cant 1 percentage point.
Some signi¯cant di®erences do remain, particularly with respect to the mean
SAT verbal and SAT mathematics scores, which also change sign from positive
to negative. The matching process results in increased weight being applied to
schools with weaker students on average among the untreated schools. Still,
the imposition of the common support and kernel weighting result in a set of
control schools that is more balanced.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Summary Statistics
[Table 3 about here]
Table 3 presents the mean values of various score sending outcomes. We
see that the mean proportion of students who send more than four score re-
ports remains fairly stable. The proportion sending score reports to UT Austin
decreased slightly, while the corresponding statistic for Texas A&M dropped
dramatically from 0.31 to 0.23. This is only slightly re°ected in the `Flag-
ship' column, which represents the proportion of students who send to both UT
Austin as well as Texas A&M. There is a slight upward trend in the proportion
sending to non-selective public Texas colleges and universities, and a down-
ward trend in the proportion sending to colleges located outside of Texas. The
proportion sending to elite national universities remained small and fairly stable.
4.2 Top Ten Percent Rule
[Table 4 about here]
Table 4 presents individual level regression results for score sending behavior.
The mean temporal change in behavior for students in a particular rank is cap-
tured by the coe±cients on the indicator variable Post interacted with the rele-
vant class rank variable. The dependent variable in column two is an indicator
variable for whether the student sent more than four SAT score reports. In the
10post period, students in the 1st decile were 5.7 percentage points less likely to
send out more than four scores, and the di®erence is signi¯cant at the 1 percent
level. Test-takers in the second decile and second quintile were also signi¯cantly
less likely to send out more than four reports, by 1.9 and 1.5 percentage points
respectively. Being in the top decile means that the uncertainty of admission is
reduced, hence the reduction in the probability of sending out more than four
score reports. It is resonable that students whose self-reported class rank in
the second decile and second quintile decreasing the number of score reports
that they send. If students in the second decile and second quintile under the
TTPR perceive that the set of colleges to which they could gain admission has
decreased relative to similarly ranked students prior to the TTPR, then a rea-
sonable response is to decrease the set of schools in the college choice set|for
example, \reach" schools or the schools on the margin of the students' expecta-
tion of gaining admission could be dropped. This explanation is consistent with
the decline in the likelihood of students who report being ranked in the second
quintile sending score reports to the University of Texas at Austin.
In examining column three, students in the top decile increase their proba-
bility of applying to UT Austin by about 3 percentage points, and the di®erence
is signi¯cant at the one percent level. In contrast, the probability that students
in the second quintile send a score to UT Austin decreases signi¯cantly by 1.6
percentage points. Assuming that UT Austin is the most prestigious public col-
lege in Texas, this suggests that the e®ect of the TTPR is enhancing the degree
of sorting by students depending on their class rank.
In column four, we observe that the proportion of students sending a score
report to Texas A&M increases among students in the no rank designation, third
quintile, fourth quintile and ¯fth quintile, by 1.3, 1.2, 2.9, and 2.3 percentage
points, respectively. This is a interesting result. Texas A&M is one of Texas's
most selective public institutions. Texas A&M and the University of Texas
at Austin were the only two public universities in Texas that were ranked as
highly selective by Barron's Guide to Colleges and Universities in 1998. After
the change in the admissions regime, we would have expected that students in
the lower rank deciles would lower their perceived chances of admissions, yet
we see students in the lower rank deciles are more likely to apply to Texas
A&M-College Station. This suggests that students' average perception of the
probability of admissions varies across rank and across institutions in ways that
aren't consistent with the theory.
Column ¯ve contains the results for the impact of the admissions regime
change on the likelihood of sending to a non-selective public four-year universi-
ties in Texas.18 We observe that students from all class ranks are less likely to
send score reports to non-selective Texas institutions. This decrease is largest
among students in the top decile, at 4.4 percentage points. This result is con-
sistent with the notion that students in the top decile have a higher quality
minimum with respect to college choice.
18There are seventeen such institutions as given by Barron's Guide to Colleges and Univer-
sities in 1998. Examples of such institutions include The University of Houston-Downtown,
Texas A&M-Texarkana, and The University of Texas at San Antonio.
11The results in column six provide evidence that students in the top decile
are less likely to apply to elite national universities, while those outside of the
top decile are more likely to do so, although the coe±cient estimates are rela-
tively small for each category of self-reported rank. Column seven contains the
estimates for the outcome of sending a score report to both the University of
Texas at Austin and Texas A&M-College Station. Our coe±cient estimates vary
by class rank. The estimates are relatively small for students in the ¯rst two
deciles. In contrast, score sending to both schools decreases by 3.7 percentage
points among students in the second quintile. It increases, although by smaller
amounts, among students in the bottom three quintiles. This is interesting be-
cause it suggests that students in the second quintile might be choosing between
the two °agships, whereas students in the lower quintiles feel the need to apply
more widely if they are to be granted admission to any of the state °agships.
In the ¯nal column, we observe that students in the ¯rst decile, second decile,
and students who report no rank are less likely to send a score report to an out-
of-state college, by 2.3, 1.6, and 1.3 percentage points respectively. At the
same time, students in the third quintile are more likely to apply to an out-of-
state college, by 0.9 of a percentage point. These estimates are consistent with
the notion that students in the top decile recognizing an admissions advantage
and students who report being ranked in the third quintile perceiving better
opportunities outside of the state. The result for students in the second decile
and those reporting no rank is surprising.
In summation, we ¯nd that student application behavior changed in response
to the transparent usage of class rank in the admissions process. We ¯nd that
the Top Ten Percent Rule had heterogenous treatment e®ects, with top decile
students sending fewer scores, being more likely to apply to UT-Austin and less
likely to apply to an out-of-state or non-selective institution. Middle and lower
ranked students, on the other hand, are more likely to apply to Texas A&M
or to an out-of-state college. Indeed, some of the strange results strengthen
the notion of heterogeneous response and highlight the need to think carefully
about how the heavy handed use of a single characteristic can have unanticipated
consequences.
4.3 Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship and Century Schol-
arship
[Table 5 about here]
Table 5 contains estimates of the impact of the targeted recruitment programs
using both the before-after research design and the weighted di®erence-in-di®erences
estimator. The top panel contains estimates for the impact of the LOS program
on the likelihood of sending a score report to the University of Texas at Austin.
Using the before-after method, we estimate that the LOS program had a signif-
icant and large impact on score sending to UT Austin for students in the ¯rst
decile only, at 8.8 percentage points. The e®ects of the the LOS program on
the other rank designations are small and statistically insigni¯cant.
12The next column in the top panel of Table 5 contains the di®erence-in-
di®erence estimates. Relative to the estimates obtained using the before-after
analysis, four di®erences emerge. First, the estimated treatment e®ects of the
LOS program obtained using weighted di®erence-in-di®erences are larger in
magnitude. Second, the treatment e®ect estimates of the LOS program for
the second decile and the second quintile, and the third quintile attain both
economic and statistical signi¯cance. Third, the estimated treatment e®ects of
the LOS program for test takers in the fourth quintile, ¯fth quintile, and the no
rank category switch signs relative to the estimates obtained from the pre-post
analysis, but show no change in statistical signi¯cance.
We now estimate that the LOS increased score sending rates to UT Austin
by 9.6, 3.2, 2.5, and 2.2 percentage points for students in the ¯rst decile, second
decile, second quintile, and third quintile respectively. To place these results into
context, we compare these coe±cients to the sending rates to UT Austin in the
set of LOS prior to those schools receiving the LOS programs. Among students
in the ¯rst decile, second decile, second quintile, and third quintile sending rates
to UT Austin were 36.9, 26.2, 19.6 and 14.1 percentage points, respectively.
Interpreted in this way, the estimated percentage increase for these groups are
26.0 percent, 12.3 percent, 12.8 percent , and 15.6 percent, respectively.
The bottom panel in Table 5 contains estimates for the impact of the Cen-
tury Scholars program on the likelihood of sending a score report to Texas A&M
University. The results from the before-after analysis indicates that the largest
e®ects are obtained for students who report being ranked in the top decile. The
estimate indicates that students are 3.1 percentage points more likely to send
a score report to Texas A&M; the estimate is not statistically signi¯cant. Esti-
mates for the other rank designations are small and statistically insigni¯cant.
The weighted di®erence-in-di®erences analysis of the CS program reveals
some surprising results. The estimated e®ect for the top decile is 2.8 percentage
points, but it is not statistically signi¯cant. We estimate a 2.3 percentage point
increase in the probability of sending to Texas A&M for test takers who do not
report rank. This is a 19.2 percent gain relative to the rate at which students
in CS schools who reported no rank sent to Texas A&M prior to the high
schools receiving the CS program. We estimate a 2.8 percentage point increase
in probability of sending to Texas A&M for test takers who report being ranked
in the third quintile, which is a 15.6 percent gain relative to the rate at which
students in CS schools who reported no rank sent to Texas A&M prior to the
high schools receiving the CS program.
Overall, these ¯ndings are remarkable. The impact of the LOS and CS are
economically large and signi¯cant. They also have the largest impact on the
best ranked students in these schools which makes sense because students who
are ranked in the top decile are guaranteed admission, but we also ¯nd signif-
icant e®ects throughout the distribution of rank. Our ¯ndings are consistent
with the hypothesis that student application decisions from under-represented
high schools are subject to multiple constraints. The constraints include the
likelihood of admission, funding, and post-enrollment support. Our estimates
indicate that when these constraints are relaxed, students respond.
135 Conclusion
Our analysis and results highlighted important new insights. As expected, there
is signi¯cant heterogeneity in the e®ects of the law which vary with the self-
reported rank. Ignoring the heterogeneous e®ects of the change in the admis-
sions regime leads to incorrect inferences about the e®ects of perceived changes
in admissions probabilities on students' application behavior, as proxied for by
score report sending. For example, test-takers who indicate that they are ranked
in the second decile are less likely to apply to UT-Austin; this implies that tal-
ented but lower ranked students are less likely to apply and reduces the breadth
of the pool of students that admissions o±cer can consider.
The targeted recruitment program implemented by UT Austin and Texas
A&M was successful at attracting potential applications from students at dis-
advantaged schools. Test-takers who reported being ranked in the top decile
responded greatest to the targeted recruitment programs. Policy makers should
consider multi-faceted responses in order to avail deserving students from dis-
advantaged backgrounds of the opportunity to matriculate at Texas's °agship
institutions.
The targeted recruitment programs demonstrate that it is possible to attract
students from high schools that were not traditional sources of students for the
University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M. However, our results do not pro-
vide su±cient information to determine if these programs are suitable for other
institutions. Two pieces of information are required to make this calculation:
1. The return per dollar invested in the targeted recruitment program. 2. The
value to a particular university of attracting students from disadvantaged high
schools. The ¯rst value can be thought of as the number of applicants per dollar
invested. In terms of simple scholarships, where students receive only money
and additional services, a measure of return can be obtained by dividing the
change in the number of applicants by the amount of the scholarship. Applying
such a metric to calculate the returns to the Longhorn Opportunity Scholar-
ship Program and the Century Scholars Program grossly overstates the returns
to the programs because the calculation does not account for the total cost of
providing all the services to the recipients.19 The second value depends on the
preferences of the university with regard to the perceived bene¯t of having stu-
dents from disadvantaged backgrounds on campus and is di±cult to ascertain.
However, given that the targeted recruitment programs still exist, we conclude
that the University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M regard the programs as
being su±ciently bene¯cial.
Legislators in Texas have considered altering the Top Ten Percent Rule. (see
Embry, 2007) This paper demonstrates that students respond to changes in in-
formation and incentives. This paper also demonstrates that the postsecondary
institutions in Texas are able to respond e®ectively to legal constraints in order
to craft enrollment as they see ¯t. At a minimum, our evidence suggests that
19Both scholarships award ¯ve thousand dollars per year for four years. We were unable to
obtain the full cost of administering the targeted recruitment programs.
14the legislators should consider the interaction of both student and institutional
responses to any changes in admissions policy.
Appendix Table in the Appendix Section
6 Acknowledgements
The authors thank Charlie Brown, Sheldon Danziger, John DiNardo, David
Lam, Jim Levinsohn, Justin McCrary, Cecelia Rouse, Je® Smith, and two anony-
mous referees for comments and suggestions that greatly improved the quality
of the manuscript. We thank both The College Board for providing the SAT
data and the Texas Education Agency for the crosswalk ¯le that enabled us to
merge in the high school level variables. Vimal Ranchhod acknowledges sup-
port from the Fogarty International Center (Grant: D43-TW000654) and the
National Research Foundation of South Africa. The usual disclaimer applies.
15References
(2000). Barron's Pro¯les of American Colleges (24th ed.). New York: Barron's
Educational Series, Inc.
Bertrand, M., E. Du°o, and S. Mullainathan (2004). How much should we trust
di®erence in di®erences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1),
249 { 275.
Card, D. and A. Krueger (2005). Would the elimination of a±rmative action
a®ect highly quali¯ed minority applicants? evidence from california and texas.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 56, 416 { 434.
Dickson, L. M. (2006, February). Does ending a±rmative action in college
admissions lower the percent of minority students applying to college? Eco-
nomics of Education Review 25, 109 { 119.
Embry, J. (2007, May). Senate votes to change top ten percent rule. Austin
American-Staesman.
Kain, J. F., D. M. O'Brien, and P. A. Jargowsky (2005). Hopwood and the
top ten percent law: How they have a®ected the college enrollment decisions
of texas high school graduates. Texas Schools Project at The University of
Texas at Dallas.
Long, M. C. (2004). College applications and the e®ect of a±rmative action.
Journal of Econometrics 121(1-2), 319{342.
Long, M. C. (2007, March-April). A±rmative action and its alternatives in
public universities: What do we know? Public Administration Review 67(2),
311{325.
Moulton, B. R. (1990). An illustration of a pitfall in estimating the e®ects of
aggregate variables on micro units. The Review of Economics and Statis-
tics 72(2), 334 { 338.
Niu, S., M. Tienda, and K. Cortes (2006). College selectivity and the texas top
10% law. Economics of Education Review 25(3), 259 {272.
Rosenbaum, P. R. and D. B. Rubin (1983). The central role of the propensity
score in observational studies for causal e®ects. Biometrika 70(1), 41 { 55.
Thomas, M. K. (2004, April). Seeking every advantage: the phenomenon of
taking both the sat and act. Economics of Education Review 23(2), 203{208.
Tienda, M. and S. Niu (2006). Flagships, feeders, and the texas top 10% law:
A test of the brain drain hypothesis. Journal of Higher Education 76(4), 712
{ 739.
16Figures


















0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
Common Support for LOS
17Figure 2: Propensity Score Histograms For LOS Schools: Propensity







































0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
Common Support for CS
19Figure 4: Propensity Score Histograms For CS Schools: Propensity





















20Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Year No. of Obs % Blacka;b % Hispanic % Whitec % Female Mean SAT-V Mean SAT-M
1996 83,769 { { { 54.7 460 466
1997 87,750 { { { 54.73 459 467
1998 94,136 { { { 54.84 456 463
1999 98,730 11.45 16.54 51.95 54.73 453 459
2000 103,367 11.11 16.57 49.46 54.41 454 461
2001 105,015 11.22 16.73 47.87 54.57 452 459
2002 110,097 11.23 16.58 45.07 54.57 488 499
2003 115,260 10.84 16.37 40.48 54.02 452 460
2004 118,224 12.07 18.28 43.53 54.19 450 458
Notes: aWe have no racial data for the 1996{1998 cohorts.
bThe residual race/ethnic category is 'other'.
cThe decrease in the percent White is primarily matched by a corresponding increase in the percent not reporting
race. (Corr coe® = - 0.66)
21Table 2a: Di®erence in Means between Non-LOS and LS schools:
1996
Full-Sample Common Support
Non- LOS ¢ (s.e.) Non- LOS ¢ (s.e.)
LOS LOS
Mean SAT Verbal 1996 446.18 360.04 86.14 (10.22) 317.33 366.74 -49.42 (24.40)
Mean SAT Math 1996 446.33 365.86 80.47 (10.35) 320.73 373.61 -52.88 (24.48)
% Male 1996 45.00 41.00 4.00 (2.00) 47.00 41.00 6.00 (4.00)
% LEP 1996 4.12 13.32 -9.20 (1.10) 15.00 15.34 -0.35 (3.46)
% Poor 1996 31.98 54.76 -22.78 (2.49) 58.84 56.58 2.26 (5.87)
% White 1996 62.79 7.06 55.73 (3.38) 8.75 8.23 0.52 (1.74)
% Black 1996 9.64 38.70 -29.05 (2.02) 21.93 28.82 -6.89 (7.03)
% Hispanic 1996 26.00 52.77 -26.77 (3.57) 68.30 61.27 7.03 (7.35)
% in Twelfth Grade 1996 18.24 16.53 1.71 (0.74) 15.49 16.85 -1.35 (0.77)
Teacher's Experience 12.34 13.82 -1.47 (0.30) 12.03 13.53 -1.49 (0.71)
Student/Teacher Ratio 13.49 16.73 -3.23 (0.38) 16.53 16.50 0.03 (0.65)
% Taking Admissions Exam 63.90 54.00 9.90 (2.20) 48.86 53.65 -4.79 (4.82)
% Sending to UT-Austin 28.00 21.00 7.00 (2.00) 22.00 23.00 -1.00 (3.00)
% Sending to Texas A&M 31.00 17.00 14.00 (2.00) 24.00 17.00 7.00 (5.00)
N 936 65 936 55
Notes: In column ¯ve, Non-LOS schools are weighted by the kernel weight from the matching
procedure.
s.e. is the standard error of the di®erence in the preceding column.
% LEP is the percentage of the high school that has Limited English Pro¯cency
% Poor is the percentage of students on free or reduced price meals.
Table 2b: Di®erence in Means between Non-CS and CS schools: 1996
Full-Sample Common Support
Non- CS ¢ (s.e) Non- CS ¢ (s.e)
CS CS
Mean SAT Verbal 1996 443.26 372.88 70.38 (13.46) 363.42 391.12 -27.70 (26.95)
Mean SAT Math 1996 443.44 381.90 61.54 (13.60) 365.00 405.85 -40.85 (26.57)
% Male 1996 45.00 42.00 2.00 (3.00) 45.00 43.00 2.00 (3.00)
% LEP 1996 4.40 12.73 -8.33 (1.45) 7.87 18.74 -10.87 (3.02)
% Poor 1996 33.07 43.46 -10.39 (3.32) 44.97 47.28 -2.31 (4.31)
% White 1996 61.13 9.55 51.58 (4.64) 23.39 14.94 8.44 (4.12)
% Black 1996 9.89 53.07 -43.18 (2.51) 34.04 30.55 3.49 (8.07)
% Hispanic 1996 27.49 34.13 -6.64 (4.73) 40.89 49.53 -8.64 (7.34)
% in Twelfth Grade 1996 18.22 15.91 2.31 (0.95) 16.76 16.13 0.63 (0.91)
Teacher's Experience 12.37 14.16 -1.79 (0.39) 13.01 13.47 -0.46 (0.60)
Student/Teacher Ratio 13.56 17.47 -3.92 (0.49) 16.41 16.90 -0.48 (0.67)
% Taking Admissions Exam 63.55 55.87 7.69 (2.85) 53.24 54.61 -1.37 (4.67)
% Sending to UT-Austin 28.00 21.00 7.00 (3.00) 27.00 26.00 1.00 (4.00)
% Sending to Texas A&M 31.00 20.00 11.00 (3.00) 25.00 22.00 3.00 (4.00)
N 963 38 963 23
Notes: In column ¯ve, Non-CS schools are weighted by the kernel weight from the matching
procedure.
s.e. is the standard error of the di®erence in the preceding column.
% LEP is the percentage of the high school that has Limited English Pro¯cency
% Poor is the percentage of students on free or reduced price meals.
22Table 3: Means of Score Report Sending Behaviora
Year >4 Scoresb UT-Austin TX A&M Non-selectivec Elited Flagships Out-of-State
1996 0.33 0.35 0.31 0.32 0.07 0.16 0.44
1997 0.33 0.34 0.30 0.33 0.07 0.16 0.44
1998 0.32 0.33 0.28 0.31 0.06 0.15 0.42
1999 0.31 0.33 0.28 0.31 0.06 0.15 0.41
2000 0.31 0.35 0.29 0.33 0.06 0.16 0.41
2001 0.32 0.34 0.28 0.34 0.06 0.16 0.41
2002 0.32 0.33 0.27 0.35 0.06 0.15 0.40
2003 0.32 0.33 0.25 0.36 0.06 0.14 0.39
2004 0.31 0.32 0.23 0.37 0.05 0.13 0.37
Notes: aThe cells contain the proportion of test-takers exhibiting a certain score-report behavior.
b>4 Scores refers to test-takers who designate more than four colleges to receive score reports.
cNon-selective refers to Non-selective, public, four-year universities in Texas as ranked by Barron's.
Guide to Colleges and Universities in 1998.
dElite refers to a top ten national college as ranked by the U.S. News and World Report for the year 1998.
23Table 4: Individual level regressions for score-report sending with
¯xed e®ects
Dependent Variables
>4 Scores UT-Austin TX A&M Non-Selective Elite Flagships Out-of-State
Post£No Rank 0.038 0.005 0.013 -0.036 0.002 0.013 -0.013
[0.004]** [0.004] [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.002] [0.003]** [0.005]**
Post£1st Decile -0.057 0.030 -0.003 -0.041 -0.008 0.004 -0.023
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004] [0.0036]** [0.003]* [0.004] [0.004]**
Post£2nd Decile -0.019 0.004 0.003 -0.033 -0.003 0.006 -0.016
[0.004]** [0.004] [0.004] [0.0036]** [0.002] [0.003]** [0.004]**
Post£2nd Quintile -0.015 -0.016 -0.002 -0.032 -0.004 -0.037 -0.001
[0.004]** [0.003]** [0.003] [0.004]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.004]
Post£3rd Quintile 0.002 -0.006 0.012 -0.030 0.007 0.005 0.009
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.001]** [0.002]** [0.004]*
Post£4th Quintile 0.008 -0.001 0.029 -0.019 0.008 0.014 0.009
[0.006] [0.006] [0.005]** [0.007]** [0.002]** [0.004]** [0.007]
Post£5th Quintile 0.015 0.033 0.023 0.001 0.007 0.015 0.004
[0.013] [0.012]** [0.011]* [0.014] [0.004] [0.007]** [0.015]
Trend (®T) 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 0.0123 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.001]**
A±rmative Action (®1996) 0.000 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.001 0.005 -0.002
[0.003] [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.001] [0.002]** [0.003]
No Rank -0.090 -0.003 0.003 -0.060 0.010 -0.052 0.003
[0.004]** [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]** [0.002]** [0.003] [0.005]**
Top Decile 0.213 0.176 0.156 -0.108 0.165 0.114 0.185
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
2nd Decile 0.100 0.122 0.122 -0.042 0.039 0.084 0.086
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.004]**
2nd Quintile 0.06 0.077 0.074 -0.010 0.008 0.051 0.04
[0.003]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.004]**
4th Quintile -0.046 -0.048 -0.051 -0.016 0.002 -0.027 -0.023
[0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.002] [0.004]** [0.007]**
5th Quintile -0.067 -0.073 -0.040 -0.073 0.014 -0.018 -0.027
[0.011]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.014]** [0.004]** [0.007]** [0.014]
Constant 0.028 -0.094 -0.034 0.341 -0.053 -0.048 0.077
[0.067] [0.105] [0.083] [0.064]** [0.029]* [0.066] [0.081]
Observations 865,490 865,490 865,490 865,490 865,490 865,490 865,490
R2 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.12
Notes:* signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1% Standard errors clustered at the high school level. Omitted coe±cients include
student SAT math and verbal scores, racial composition of the school, % on reduced price meals, the number of 12th graders
per school, teacher-to-student ratio, teacher experience, and whether the school subsequently gets LOS or CS. All dependent
variables are binary. Models include high school ¯xed e®ects. Standard errors are clustered at the high school level.
24Table 5: E®ects of LOS and CS
Before-After Dif-in-Dif
LOS
No Rank -.008 .007
[.010] [.011]
Top Decile .088 .096
[.016]** [.011]**
2nd Decile .021 .032
[.011] [.011]**
2nd Quintile .007 .025
[.010] [.008**]
3rd Quintile .002 .022
[.009] [.009]**
4th Quintile -.004 .023
[.011] [.012]





No Rank .010 .023
[.014] [.011]*
Top Decile .031 .028
[.020] [.017]
2nd Decile .011 .003
[.016] [.014]
2nd Quintile .006 .015
[.017] [.013]
3rd Quintile .002 .028
[.013] [.012]**
4th Quintile -.003 .010
[.021] [.017]




Notes: *!5 % signi¯cance level; **!1 % signi¯cance level. For
the LOS Program, the dependent variable is a binary variable that
assumes a value of one if a student submits a score to UT-Austin
and assumes a value of zero otherwise. For the CS Program, the
dependent variable is a binary variable that assumes a value of one
if a student submits a score to Texas A&M and assumes a value of
zero otherwise. The second column estimates of the impact of
targeted recruitment programs using a pre-post design. The third
column contains estimates of the impact of targeted recruitment
programs using a weighted di®erence-in-di®erences estimation
strategy. The models include high school ¯xed e®ects, and
standard errors are clustered at the high school level.
25Appendix
\General academic teaching institution"20 means The University of Texas at
Austin; The University of Texas at El Paso; The University of Texas of the
Permian Basin; The University of Texas at Dallas; The University of Texas
at San Antonio; Texas A&M University, Main University; The University of
Texas at Arlington; Tarleton State University; Prairie View A&M Univer-
sity; Texas Maritime Academy; Texas Tech University; University of North
Texas; Lamar University; Lamar State College{Orange; Lamar State College{
Port Arthur; Texas A&M University{Kingsville; Texas A&M University{Corpus
Christi; Texas Woman's University; Texas Southern University; Midwestern
State University; University of Houston; University of Texas{Pan American;
The University of Texas at Brownsville; Texas A&M University{Commerce;
Sam Houston State University; Texas State University{San Marcos; West Texas
A&M University; Stephen F. Austin State University; Sul Ross State University;
Angelo State University; The University of Texas at Tyler; and any other col-
lege, university, or institution so classi¯ed as provided in this chapter or created
and so classi¯ed, expressly or impliedly, by law.
20De¯nition as given by Subtitle B Chapter 61 Subchapter A of Texas's Education Code
26Appendix Table: Propensity Score Estimates
LOS CS
% sending to UT-Austin{1996 -2.21
[0.690]**
% sending to Texas A&M{1996 -.509
[.775]
% Poor{1996 .012 -.006
[.007] [.007]
% Black{1996 .018 .018
[.004]** [.004]**
% White{1996 -.041 -.031
[008]** [.008]**
% Taking College Entrance Exam{1996 .005 .002
[.005] [.006]
Student/Teacher Ratio{1996 .131 .096
[.032]** [.033]**
Pseudo R2 .595 .537
Â2 296.3 177.4
N 1090 1090
Notes: ¤ p < 0:05, ¤¤ p < 0:01
Table contains coe±cients from probit regressions. Standard errors are
in parentheses. Sample consists of Texas Public High Schools.
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